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` This project presents a multi-media description (photos, drawings, maps, original documents, etc.) 
and analysis of a set of civil development projects that I envisioned, proposed, and supervised while as-
signed as a platoon leader in C Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th U.S. Cavalry. C Troop conducted stability, 
counter-insurgency, and reconstruction operations in the Balad Ruz area of eastern Diayala Province, 
Iraq from November 2003 to February 2004.  During that period, prior to any mature project manage-
ment bureaucracy, I received access to civil development opportunities and funds generally limited to 
Civil Affairs teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). 
As the originator of these projects and many of their founding ideas, my experience has both en-
abled and hindered full assessment of the processes and their outcomes. My participation in the delib-
erations and decisions enables the detailed description included here, but also challenges my capacity 
for unbiased evaluation of the procedural errors and resulting shortfalls. This is an unresolved tension, cre-
ated by my dual roles as actor and assessor, that is evident throughout this project. 
The reader will notice numerous referrals to me as the arbitrator and final decider for the design 
and development of these projects, especially Ettihad. These personal allusions are not intended to ad-
vance a personally favorable view of the development process, but to provide an honest recounting of 
the process. This deference to my own “vision” and “education”, as subsequent research and reflection 
strongly suggests, correlates with a number of the challenges I experienced. This project is intended to 
provide an in-depth account of civil reconstruction in a foreign culture in order to explore the chal-
lenges, discuss the lessons learned, and propose recommendations to improve similar reconstruction en-
deavors undertaken by American civilian and military entities in the future. 
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“Our objective should be to enrich the lives of all of our people by making things of the spirit, the creation of beauty 
part of their daily lives, by giving them new hopes and sources of interest to fill their leisure, by eradicating the ugli-
ness of their surroundings, by building with a sense of beauty as well as mere utility, and by fostering all the simple 
pleasures of life which are not important in terms of dollars spent but are immensely important in terms of a higher 
standard of living.” 1 
      --- Edward Bruce , Director of New Deal  Public Works of Art Project  (PWAP) 
Children and townspeople at the Balad Ruz Children’s Park 
 
 
Edward Bruce made the opening statement during 
the depths of the Great Depression, when America’s so-
cial conditions were the  worst in our history. Bruce was 
director of one of the many federal agencies that coop-
erated to reconstruct the American economy and rein-
force our democratic institutions.  In 2003, many of these 
same crisis conditions existed in Iraq.  The Coalition top-
pling of Saddam Hussein’s authoritarian rule provided 
Iraqis with an opportunity for a more democratic govern-
ment and more pluralistic society. But, Iraqi communities 
were in more desperate need of reconstruction to ad-
dress their dismal social conditions. As a platoon leader 
operating in the eastern Diayala Province, I was part of an 
organization positioned to help make Edward Bruce’s vi-
sion a reality.  In late 2003, recent appropriations and de-
mand for immediate reconstruction provided me an op-
portunity to propose, design and administer three such 
projects. This multi-media work (photos, drawings, maps, 
original documents, etc.) describes and analyzes of a set 
of civil development projects that I envisioned, proposed, 
and supervised to address abhorrent social conditions 
and lay a foundation for democracy and pluralism in Iraq. 
I incorporated numerous people’s ideas and aspira-
tions to assemble a complement of proposals to garner 
Coalition funding. I intended for money from these pro-
posals to provide enhanced educational opportunities, 
community improvements, and cultural development pro-
jects to help satisfy Iraq’s enormous need for basic civic 
resources. The resulting projects included the Ettihad 
School, Community Center and clinic, the Balad Ruz Chil-
dren's’ Park, and the works known collectively as the Unity 
Murals. This project is an academic appraisal of the ideas 
integrated into the Ettihad Complex and Balad Ruz com-
munity improvements, as well as the process used to envi-
sion, enact, and complete these demonstrations of de-
mocratic civic endeavor. Most pertinently, this work is an 
examination of lessons learned through the course of 
these projects.  
In November of 2003, eight months after Coalition 
Forces toppled Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime, C 
Troop, 1-10 Cavalry Squadron relocated to the town of 
Balad Ruz . Our troop assumed responsibility for security, 
reconstruction, and development of the city and environs 
of Balad Ruz, an urban area of over 80,000 people in the 
Diayala Province of eastern Iraq. In addition to combat 
operations and employment of indigenous security forces, 
C Troop also supervised most of the reconstruction pro-
jects in the Balad Ruz area. Soon after C Troop’s arrival in 
Balad Ruz, the troop commander, CPT Eric Jamison, and 
the officers of C Troop, to include myself, conceived a vi-
sion for expansion and improvement   of reconstruction 
and development of the local communities, the govern-
ment, and the infrastructure. C Troop  immediately devel-
oped a vision for operations in Balad Ruz that included 
not only military operations and law enforcement support, 
but also an extensive array of civilian endeavors aimed at 
improving living conditions and nurturing the growth of a 
truly representative government. Coalition funds ear-
marked for civilian projects served as the primary financial 
method for achieving C Troop’s measures for holistic im-
provement. The 4th Infantry Division’s preparation for relin-
quishing responsibility provided the opportunity, through 
the Division’s unused civilian project funds, for C Troop to 
realize our ambition of implementing initiatives specifically 
targeted at improving the lives and opportunities of the 
population while nurturing democratic ideals. 
  
 GENERAL CONDITIONS 
Although we worked to promote democracy 




throughout Iraq, operated in the long shadow of Saddam 
Hussein's Ba’athist rule. There was glaring evidence of the 
neglect and degradation that resulted from Saddam Hus-
sein's pursuit of military might and nationalistic glorification 
in lieu of infrastructure, access to education, and eco-
nomic stability. The Ba’ath Regime’s most significant im-
pacts were on the psyche of the Iraqi people. The socie-
tal ties that bonded neighbor to neighbor, countrymen to 
countrymen, and community to community no longer ex-
isted. These bonds had very little opportunity to develop 
in the violently authoritarian Ba’ath political system under 
Saddam Hussein. Hussein had often portrayed himself as 
a benevolent national leader for millions of adoring Iraqis, 
but this was not the Iraqi reality. Just like the authoritarian 
states that preceded Iraq, Hussein’s authoritarianism was 
promoted as a benign authoritarianism that simply made 
decisions in the best interests of the citizens themselves. 
But, as once again proven in Iraq, authoritarianism by na-
ture is never benign.2 While only feigning benevolence 
and propriety, the Ba’athist authority structure, led by 
Hussein, was primarily concerned with conservation of 
power.  While maintaining many of the associations of 
power, the true function of a stable, benign state author-
ity is to serve as a repository of trust. Legitimacy of author-
ity is a function of the ability and the trustworthiness of 
leaders who act according to the precepts recognized 
by these leaders and by those over whom they exercise 
leadership.3 In the Iraq that Saddam Hussein ruled for 
over thirty years, this certainly was not the case. The 
Ba’athists ruled through power of fear rather than legiti-
mate authority, leaving an Iraq of fractured communities 
that lacked the education, infrastructure, and institutions 
required for pluralist prosperity. 
 By May of 2003, after the U.S.-led Coalition de-
posed Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraqis and the world 
were contemplating how to build a new Iraq and fulfill the 
promise of a representative pluralistic government. On 
May 22, 2003, the United Nations Security Council issued 
Resolution 1483 laying out the responsibilities of the interim 
Authority (Coalition Forces in Iraq) and expectations for 
the new Iraq: 
 [The U.N. is] stressing the right of the Iraqi 
people freely to determine their own political 
future and…resolved that the United Nations 
should play a vital role in humanitarian relief, 
the reconstruction of Iraq, and the restoration 
and establishment of national and local insti-
tutions for representative governance.4  
In addition to clearly stating the intention for a genuinely 
representative government in Iraq, the resolution also 
charged the Authority in Iraq (Coalition Forces) with work-
ing to establish the basic conditions for a stable and free 
Iraq, stating: 
 The Security Council calls upon the Author-
ity to promote the welfare of the people of 
Iraq through the effective administration of 
the territory, including in particular working 
towards the restoration of conditions of se-
curity and stability and the creation of con-
ditions in which the Iraqi people can freely 
determine their own political future.5 
Under the aegis of this resolution and according Coalition 
policies, the forces in Iraq set out to establish security, sta-
bility, and political freedom in Iraq. 
 Most of the Coalition commanders and policy 
makers in Iraq envisioned the response to the U.N.’s 
charge  as extending Western political traditions. Coalition 
leaders generally saw the future of Iraq in democratic 
terms, presupposing that Iraqis wanted to be citizens of a 
democratic republic. In the new Iraqi democracy the 
Coalition envisioned, important public decisions on ques-
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indirectly, on communities’ collective endorsement. This 
vision built on an assumption that all citizens would have 
equal access to the political and bureaucratic systems. 
However, growth of such democratic ideals in Iraq faced 
many challenges. The bureaucracy and leadership would 
have to abandon the long-standing currencies of power, 
influence and nepotism for more pluralistic and inclusion-
ary processes. Even if the Iraqi populace accepted these 
fundamentals of democracy, they could not realize a 
truly representative political system without the mecha-
nisms to support basic community functions such as public 
participation, education and agreeable living conditions. 
  Despite the Coalition proclamations, manifestation 
of these democratic ideals in Iraq faced many chal-
lenges. To develop more democratic and pluralistic social 
norms, the populace needed to abandon the social 
structure brokered on power, nepotism, and favoritism es-
tablished under Saddam’s Ba’athist regime.  Even if the 
Iraqi populace internalized these fundamentals, they 
could not attain them without developing and promoting 
the basic community mechanisms that would promote 
improved living conditions, political participation, and un-
fettered access to basic education. 
  
 C TROOP OPERATIONS IN THE BALAD RUZ AREA 
 Upon taking tactical control of the Balad Ruz area, 
C Troop’s first priority was integrating the Iraqi Police (IP), 
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), and newly established 
Iraqi Army (IA) into our continuous security operations. 
Most of our time and effort, like most other tactical units in 
Iraq, was dedicated to the security operations con-
ducted both independently and with Iraqi security forces. 
In November of 2003 most tactical units like ours were fo-
cusing almost exclusively on unilateral security and 
pseudo-military operations. But C Troop, under the guid-
ance of CPT Eric Jamison, indentified and prioritized civil 
development initiatives to immediately improve condi-
tions in the surrounding community. Rather than waiting 
for over-tasked Army Civil Affairs personnel to nominate 
and administer projects in Balad Ruz, C Troop leaders initi-
ated identification, nomination, and administration of civil 
improvement projects. CPT Jamison did not allow C TRP to 
focus only on immediate security concerns. Rather, he 
pushed the Troop leadership to further examine local con-
ditions and seek out appropriate solutions to promote 
Iraqi growth from a provisional state to a democratic na-
tion. The combination of CPT Jamison’s aggressive en-
gagement of wider social issues and the readily available 
Coalition reconstruction funding enabled my pursuit of 
endeavors far beyond the standard platoon leader fare. 
With CPT Jamison’s support,  I was able to initiate an am-
bitious set of civic development projects to promote and 
support the stable , democratic, and pluralistic communi-
ties required for long-term security, stability, and democ-
ratic pluralism in Iraq. 
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Upon taking responsibility for the Balad Ruz area in 
November of 2003, C Troop immediately set out to identify 
and prioritize a set of initiatives to improve security and 
stability in our area. C Troop leaders, including myself, de-
veloped a plan that identified and grouped actions by 
type of development (security, economic, political, etc.). 
Each of the parallel progressions constituted a Line of Op-
eration (LOO).7 The officers of C Troop, led 
by CPT Eric Jamison, then laid out the four 
LOOs to guide expenditure of C Troop's 
efforts and Coalition resources in our sec-
tor. The first LOO, a prerequisite for all sub-
sequent endeavors, was security. C Troop 
supported the Security LOO by employing 
Coalition and Iraqi law enforcement forces, usually in joint 
operations, with the goal of curtailing violence to the level 
of an corresponding American city.  Security was the first 
and most fundamental requirement for achievement of 
substantial and lasting success in the other LOOs.  
The second LOO that C Troop established con-
sisted of actions to set conditions for the formation of an 
independent and democratic Iraqi government at the 
local level. As a guide for the governmental develop-
ments, the officers of C Troop applied our personal knowl-
edge of the American democratic system. These democ-
ratic assumptions underpinned the decisions we made to 
shape the political landscape in our area of responsibility. 
While our own democratic traditions provided a vivid tem-
plate for Iraqi democratic institutions, a lesser understand-
ing of local culture and social structures would counter 
the long-term success of our civil development efforts in 
Balad Ruz.  
 We focused our third LOO on improvement of the 
government services, to include the security, infrastruc-
ture, and education provided by Iraqi municipal institu-
tions. Success of political institutions required the support 
and confidence of the population, a fealty built on trust 
that the Iraqi government institutions would provide basic 
services fairly and efficiently to each member of the com-
munity. While this LOO’s progression depended on expan-
sion of government service capacity, it also required se-
curity and interdiction of insurgent attacks on infrastruc-
ture. 
 Our final LOO was dedicated to elimination of the 
conditions that propagated such non-compliant and sub-
versive activity—economic counter insurgency. From oth-
ers’ experiences in previous insurgent conflicts in places 
such as Palestine and Chechnya, we knew that subver-
sives’ extremist ideologies feed on marginalized popula-
tions’ that lack many opportunities. The resulting disen-
franchisement among large portions of a population of-
ten creates the impetus for insurgent organization and re-
sistance. Our final LOO focused on eliminating these con-
ditions within our area of operations through identification, 
planning, and administration of development projects. 
Our augmentation of our overall security and stability plan 
with this non-kinetic LOO differentiated C Troop’s ap-
proach from most other tactical plans and initiatives at 
that time.  
Our ideas, plans, and actions for civil development 
were often more ambitious and sophisticated than other 
tactical units. But, we also made other prevalent mistakes 
in our pursuit of immediate security that diminished the full 
potential of our projects to help quell the growing counter
-insurgency. Following our assessment of local conditions 
and clear delineation of our LOOs,  we were able to de-
velop a plan for immediate reconstruction. This plan pur-
sue each of the interdependent requirements for a stable, 
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COMMUNITARIAN FOUNDATION OF THE CIVIC DEVELOP-
MENT CAMPAIGN 
For the civic development projects I planned and 
administered, I developed a set of project-specific LOOs 
to align efforts with the communitarian outcome that I in-
tended. The Brick Factory District was an agglomeration 
of about thirty individually owned brick factories near 
Balad Ruz. These Civic Development LOOs focused on de-
veloping the Iraqi populous, the masses, into a civis—a 
group of citizens possessing basic rights such as voting, 
deliberation of public issues, and communal determina-
tion of common good.8 In this sense,  the term “civil” dif-
fers primarily from the term “public” because of its conno-
tation of responsibility to society, to institutions, and to 
other people. The term civil also describes a community of 
citizens, their government, and their interrelations, that are 
not military or religious in nature. This idea was especially 
novel in Iraq, where almost all deliberations were dictated 
by religious or military power. 
Civil can also describe the physical manifestations 
of civic life, or civil architecture—the form and function of 
buildings for the purposes of civic life.9 The projects I pur-
sued, consisting of public architecture, accessible art, and 
urban planning, were intended to reinforce these civic 
ideals. I intended these projects and their civic aspirations 
to support and promote a larger communitarian ethic. 
This ethic assumes that communities create and sustain a 
democratic society’s most fundamental elements and the 
most vital threads of the democracy’s social support net. 
  
 COMMUNITARIAN BASIS FOR CIVIC DEVELOPEMENT 
The ethos of Communitarianism, and its implica-
tions for civic spaces, most accurately encapsulates the 
values and priorities that I identified and advanced during 
the project development process. Democratic thinkers 
advanced the Communitarian ethic as a reaction to un-
fettered individualism that fails to acknowledge the inter-
dependence and obligations required in a functional so-
ciety. Individualism in Hussein’s Iraq was reactionary, per-
petuated by the population’s fear and distrust of the 
Ba’athist government. The secretive Ba’athist internal se-
curity forces treated almost any community-based activ-
ity, such as gathering and organizing, as an attempt at 
subversion. This fear-motivated brand of individualism so 
permeated Iraqi society that local Iraqis did not conceive 
and could not consider obligation to or dependence on 
any secular entity. The local Iraqi population had lived 
without basic social justice for so long that they generally 
could not grasp their own entitlement to it. 
The Communitarian ethic acknowleges the belief 
that social justice is the foundation for the community vir-
tues of equality, stewardship, and inclusion. These virtues 
are demonstrated in communities whose moral and ethi-
cal standards reflect the fundamental human needs of all 
of their respective members. Communitarianism marries 
the precepts of individual rights and freedoms with collec-
tive responsibility and duty, this ethic supposes that the 
best social structures will  foster community and a sense of 
collective well-being.10 Simply put, Communitarianism as-
serts society’s responsibility to address their social prob-
lems, establish societal roles based on democratic citizen-
ship, and instruct proper citizenship.11 To the Iraqi people, 
these ideas and philosophies were as foreign as the 
American soldiers patrolling their villages. Yet, our long-
term success in establishing democracy in the area re-
quired their adoption of these principles. It was this Com-
munitarian ethic, seeking to foster public spirit and tame 
the reactive individualism, that underpinned our civic de-
velopment LOOs and guided the Balad Ruz and Brick 






CIVIC DEVELOPMENT LINES OF OPERATION 
 The first civic development LOO I designated was 
“Creation of Civic and Cultural Spaces to Engender 
Demo-Civic Involvement.” This LOO focused 
on building the structures to support  demo-
civil functions of the new Iraqi government 
and constructing forums for local action. Posi-
tive local action requires both input of social 
capital and creation of trust. This exchange 
demonstrates a strong connection between interpersonal 
relationships and the outcome of participatory democ-
racy.  
 In addition to local action, focal practices also 
help perpetuate democratic activity in the community. 
Susan Arai, a Communitarian scholar, writes, 
“Through voluntary associations people are 
able to participate in focal practices, and 
move beyond individual benefits and experi-
ence, to form collective networks.”12  Initia-
tion of these voluntary associations, focal 
practices, and collective networks requires 
formal and informal spaces that promote 
regular interactions and gatherings. Except 
for the city market areas, which were very 
busy and inhospitable to orderly gathering 
and deliberation, secular civic gathering 
spaces did not generally exist in the Balad 
Ruz area.  Alan Brinkley, a prominent thinker 
on the role of communities within the larger nation, ob-
served: 
 Rights cannot be sustained unless there is a civic 
life healthy enough to create a shared commit-
ment to them. Communities create freedom; free-
dom does not create itself. But in order to create 
freedom, communities also create obligations to 
honor certain common values, to respect certain 
institutions, to accept some common definition of 
what is good. We cannot hope to be truly free 
unless we identify with and share in the govern-
ance of the political community upon which our 
freedom depends.13  
The primary intent of the projects I administered was to 
create spaces to support and promote communities that 
would enable and sustain the freedom that Brinkley de-
scribes. 
 The second facet addressed the need for basic 
communication of democratic values, which was ad-
dressed by the “Democratic Education” LOO. The goal for 
this LOO was to develop  educational resources for instill-
ing and sustaining demo-civil values. The development of 
educational resources included not only increased ac-
cess to formal education, but also education by less for-
mal methods, such as public arts and activities. I intended 
this set of projects to create edifices capable of shaping 
experiences, as well as representing the power, potential, 
and legitimacy of community.14 This idea of educating the 
population about demo-civil virtues through the course of 
their daily lives is descendent from the oldest democratic 
traditions. Pericles, leader of Athens at their zenith of cul-
ture, power, and prosperity, identified the need for public 
education from as many  sources as possible. The ancient 
Athenians realized Pericles’ educational vision by integrat-
ing visual instruction into the facades of buildings on the 
Acropolis and elsewhere.15 Although C Troop would cer-
tainly not construct another Acropolis, CPT Jamison and I 
did plan to create structures and spaces encapsulating 
with similar civic and educational utility. 
 The third LOO, “Development of Health, Welfare, 
and Recreation Opportunities”, focused on providing 
spaces and resources to achieve more elemental com-
munity functions. The LOO 3 initiatives sought to improve 
the appearance of the generally distressed and un-
DEMO-CIVIC 
Characteristic of  community 
activities that render the 




tivities to identify and ad-
dress common needs of the 
community and its members 
FOCAL PRACTICES 
shared activities that allow 
citizens to interact and 
develop the bonds essen-
tial to maintaining strong 





healthy neighborhoods in the Balad Ruz and Brick Factory 
areas. Also, LOO 3 facets would help provide relatively 
safe spaces that were specifically designed and desig-
nated for youth recreation—a virtually non-existent notion 
in Iraq. Through these recreational spaces, the children of 
Balad Ruz could participate in recreation and interaction 
that, like the adult focal practices, would develop and 
strengthen the bonds of community and cooperation. 
  The fourth and final LOO was “Inspiration and Rein-
forcement of Demo-Civil Values.” The structures and 
spaces I envisioned, through their location, form, and ar-
chitectural details were intended to inspire and reinforce 
the values required for stable democratic communities.  It 
is not surprising to find that many civic institutions in Amer-
ica are predominantly sited and architecturally monu-
mentalized. These structures’ respective architectures do 
not merely symbolize importance, but also connote legiti-
mate authority and specific civic virtues.16 This LOO, 
through the use of art and architectural detail, sought to 
inspire and perpetuate a conscious choice against re-
pression, dictatorship, and the Iraqi individualism that 







I intended the first project, a community center, 
school, and clinic complex known as the Ettihad (Unity) 
Complex, to respond to the abject conditions found while 
conducting security patrols in the area. The conglomera-
tion known collectively as the Brick Factory District con-
sisted of about 30 individually owned and unassociated 
brick kilns that shared very little other than their  location. 
The Brick Factory District possessed a remote location two 
kilometers from the nearest paved road and over ten kilo-
meters from the nearest urban area of Balad Ruz. These 
brick factories were clustered around a geologic shield of 
clay-like strata well suited for bricks. The brick-making 
process spewed thick, noxious exhaust from the crude oil 
burned during the firing process. In addition to the abhor-
rent conditions, the Brick Factory’s geographic, cultural 
and economic dislocation made it a place of unparal-
leled suffering in a generally destitute country. 
  
BRICK FACTORY CONDITIONS 
Among the many factors contributing to the Brick 
Factory District’s deplorable situation, the physical isola-
tion was the most obvious. The Brick Factory’s geographic 
distance from urban and economic centers left residents 
with little access to economic goods or government ser-
vices. For the brick factory workers, few of whom had 
automobiles, the three kilometers to the nearest paved 
road and ten kilometers to the nearest urban area made 
access to schooling, healthcare, and markets infrequent 
at best. The large berms of brick-making waste surround-
ing each brick kiln and living area further removed the 
Brick Factory residents from access and from view of out-
siders. These twenty-foot berms served as instruments of 
literal and figurative isolation, denying the laborers who 
toiled and lived in their shadow any outward vantage. 
These berms also precluded inward vantage, exposing 
nothing but scattered smokestacks to casual observers. 
Without deliberately venturing into the Brick Factory Dis-
trict, passers-by had little inkling of the poverty and mea-
ger existence inside. The absence of a literal and figura-
tive view allowed Saddam’s government and the outside 
world to easily ignore or overlook the Brick Factory work-
ers’ plight.  
The Brick factory was not only geographically iso-
lated, but was also culturally and economically isolated. 
The area did not even have a formal name, signifying its 
near non-existence in the consciousness of local Iraqi 
leaders. Unlike almost all Iraqi villages, that possess clear 
religious identification and tribal hierarchies, the Brick Fac-
tory did not have designated muktars, the government 
appointed community leaders, or sheiks that were the 
senior tribal representatives and decision makers. These 
people were considered mongrels, not warranting access 
to the cultural network and hierarchy that supported all of 
Iraqi society.  
This marginalization also allowed for economic dis-
enfranchisement. The individual brick factory owners, us-
ing intimidation and violence, deterred any organization 
among laborers, which kept wages very low, and per-
petuated the workers’ economic isolation. According to 
Communitarian thought, a person’s access to social capi-
tal is greatly determined by his social position. These op-
portunities are  further constrained by such geographic 
and social obstacles as lack of financial resources and 
lack of access to educational institutions such as high 
schools and universities.17 All of these conditions existed for 
the Brick Factory population, leaving them with little social 
capital to leverage for improvement of their situation. The 
convergence of the isolating factors and lack of social 
capital made the Brick Factory population one of the 
most neglected, but least visible, populations in all of Iraq. 






Brick factory  air pollution and 
work conditions created one the 
foulest locales in all of Iraq:  
(1) Satellite imagery showing Brick Fac-
tory exhaust stretching over 5 miles 
downwind   (2) Brick Factory smokestacks 
along horizon  (3) Individual brick facto-
ries with black smokestacks  and  the iso-
lating berms of refuse (4) Brick factory 
workers, ranging from young children to 











also plagued by living and working conditions that rivaled 
the worst ghettos in the world. The kilns burned crude oil to 
produce the heat required to temper and harden the 
brick. The crude oil often spilled, where it was left to cover 
and leach into the ground, contaminating soil and 
groundwater. The burning of this crude also created thick 
black exhaust that the smokestacks belched into the sky, 
visible for miles around (see satellite imagery of the down-
wind smoke trail on page 17). This black exhaust often set-
tled over the Brick Factory District area creating the putrid 
stench and foul air that the workers were forced to live 
and labor in.  
The Brick Factory workforce included many women 
and young children as young as seven years old. While 
men were performed the most laborious tasks, such as 
moving the bricks, the more sedentary task of forming 
bricks fell to women. The young children, generally six to 
twelve years old, would load and lead the donkey-pulled 
carts that moved the loads of newly-formed brick around 
the factory area. No consideration was given for increas-
ing opportunities or reducing risks for those brick factory 
workers. This left all workers, especially children, vulnerable 
to injury from such hazards as hot oil-burning pipes, large 
animals and heavy machinery. The leaders in C Troop 
quickly realized that these conditions, beyond being ab-
horrent, also made this environment ripe for the funda-
mentalist and extremist sentiments promoted by insur-
gents and terrorists. I envisioned the Ettihad Complex as 
the first step toward remedying this malevolent environ-
ment. 
We, the C Troop leadership, decided that the pro-
ject’s  first priority was addressing these conditions. A per-
son’s cultural identity is usually contingent on the sense of 
belonging to a group or place. The creation of place is a 
fundamental human activity.18 The disaffected people of 
the Brick Factory District deserved a better place to be-
long to. I intended for Ettihad to provide the education, 
medical treatment, and community space, to support the 
population’s identification with a better place. Ettihad 
would help this place develop into a physical, social, and 
intellectual locale with a more positive future and in-
creased social capital. Samir Younes, an architectural 
theorist asserted, “Some kind of reflection (the will to act 
upon an idea or image) always precedes building (the 
activity itself), in view of the desired end (shelter).”19 
Younes’ reflection encapsulated the sub-human condi-
tions and lack of social capital in the Brick Factory. Ettihad 
would realize our specific vision for a physical and institu-
tional structure to address the Brick Factory workers’ 
needs. The structure would support the civic virtues and 
democratic involvement required for a healthier and 
more united community. 
  
A VISION FOR THE ETTIHAD COMPLEX 
Before I could propose a project to help counter-
act the Brick Factory conditions, I first had to clearly define 
the project’s purpose and intended outcome. To define 
an appropriate outcome I started with a general vision to 
guide the project design process. Supreme Court Justice 
Daniel Webster eloquently described such a communi-
tarian vision, saying:  
Justice is the great interest of man on earth…
whoever labors on this edifice with usefulness 
and distinction, whoever clears its founda-
tions, strengthens its pillars, adorns its entabla-
tures or contributes to raise its august dome…
connects…with that which is, and must be, as 




Brick factory workers were  often young children, that  did 
not go to school. They instead labored in the dirty and  




I intended for the Ettihad Complex to help provide 
Webster’s justice to the Brick Factory population by estab-
lishing both literal and figurative foundations, pillars entab-
latures and domes for the community.  Through applica-
tion of the four LOOs over the course of this project, I 
would try to realize the potential of this structure to not 
simply represent the designers’ cultural assumptions, but 
to communicate to Iraqis within their cultural vernacular.21 
This project required myself and the contractors, who 
were local Iraqis presumably sensitive to local culture, to 
create a building that was greater than a simple reflec-
tion of my ideas. While the project depended on the con-
tractors’ realizing Ettihad’s civic and communitarian un-
derpinnings, the eventual successes and shortcomings of 
the project, more than any other factor, resulted from my 
own successes and shortcomings fully understanding the 
Iraqi cultural context we worked within.  
As mentioned earlier, the initial LOO for this project 
was Creation of Civic and Cultural Spaces to Engender 
Demo-Civic Involvement.  Democracy requires spaces 
where citizens can congregate to deliberate issues and 
work on solutions.22 However, I envisioned Ettihad Com-
plex as far more than just a meeting place. I envisioned 
Ettihad as a structure to function, through its many spaces 
and forms, as a meeting hall, teaching space, medical 
clinic, recreation space, and museum. All of these uses 
would intersect to serve a common set of purposes—to 
attract public gatherings, infuse civic life with energy, and 
help define the cultural identity of the Brick Factory com-
munity.23 I expected this complex to continue the populist 
tradition of advocacy architecture while addressing the 
pressing concerns of Iraq’s least affluent.24 Above all, I 
hoped the Ettihad Complex would promote and support 
the functions that Communitarianism envisions.  
Communitarianism touts the linkage between pub-
lic interaction and the common good. This ideology 
identifies core democratic, civic, and altruis-
tic values that are developed and rein-
forced through the population’s comple-
mentary association <marginal note>.25 This 
type of public interaction depends on civic 
engagement by individual community 
members. I intended for Ettihad to support 
such civic interactions, as well as promote 
direct involvement by residents through communicative 
methods. To realize this communitarian ideal we had to 
create a structure  that would expand the 
possibilities of telling the common civic story 
as well as allow a new plurality of interpre-
tive messages.26 But, sustaining these civic 
traditions would also require improved and 
sustained education for the local popula-
tion.  
Although Ettihad would exemplify demo-civil con-
struction, sustaining the practices initiated there would re-
quire further incorporation of democratic values. LOO 2, 
Creating Opportunities for Democratic Education, would 
compose one facet of this further incorporation. Thomas 
Jefferson said,  
I look to the diffusion of light and education as 
the resource most to be relied on for ameliorat-
ing the condition, promoting virtue, and ad-
vancing happiness of man.27  
As well as improving the conditions for the Brick 
Factory community, the education provided at Ettihad’s 
primary and secondary schools would help diffuse the de-
mocratic light ithroughout this community. Any govern-
ment will degenerate if power is vested in the rulers alone, 
requiring the people to help sustain a safe depository for 
power.28 For the Brick Factory residents to attain and retain 
freedom they needed better education.  If the people do 
INTERPRETIVE  MESSAGE 
Implicit ideas that are 
derived from architec-
ture, arts, and other con-
crete forms of expression. 
COMPLEMENTARY  
ASSOCIATION 
Interaction among  dif-
ferent groups that pro-
vides benefits to all par-
ticipants, often through 





not possess at least basic education, they are especially 
susceptible to disenfranchisement. Instead of the Ettihad 
Complex inculcating regime dogma, it would serve as a 
truly public institution to promote and support communal 
exploration of ideas.29 
The third element that the Ettihad Community 
Complex would build on was LOO 3: Development of 
Community Health, Welfare, and Recreation Opportuni-
ties. While the Ettihad Complex would provide some basic 
recreational resources, the Ettihad amenities would pri-
mary focus on health and welfare. Due to the septic work-
ing conditions around the Brick Factory area, these labor-
ers had an exceptionally greater exposure to health haz-
ards and an accordingly high need for medical attention. 
The Ettihad Complex’s included clinic space would pro-
vide medical care for the Brick Factory area.  
Rural areas, such as the Brick Factory area, gener-
ally have higher rates of chronic disease and infant mor-
tality, as well as drastically increased instances of industry-
related injury and injury-related mortality.30 The geo-
graphic and economic isolation, in addition to the deplor-
able living and working conditions, further magnified the 
imperative for accessible health care for the Brick Factory 
population. The Ettihad clinic would provide the Brick Fac-
tory population with regular access to Iraqi health provid-
ers to conduct regular prevention, treatment, and referral. 
In addition to a clinic, the Ettihad site would also include 
an artesian well to provide fresh, clean water to residents 
that currently had to truck in water.  
We sited the well, like the complex itself, away from 
the brick factories to avoid many of the harmful contami-
nants, like the dumped crude oil, that seeped into the 
ground and infiltrated into groundwater.  When selecting 
the site, we balanced the need to establish Ettihad as a 
community node with the need for a healthy environ-
ment. To operate as a node, the Ettihad Complex 
needed to reside in a location central to the community. 
This would have meant locating the structure in the mid-
dle of the brick factories, in a perpetual cloud of factory 
exhaust and on long-contaminated ground. While the se-
lected location was less central to the Brick Factory Dis-
trict, the imperative for a more healthy environment far 
exceeded other placement factors. Ettihad’s site selec-
tion, inclusion of a clinic, and provision of fresh water ad-
dressed each of the major health and welfare concerns 
voiced by the population during our numerous patrols of 
the Brick Factory area. 
The final avenue of advancement for civic devel-
opment was LOO 4, Inspiration and Reinforcement of 
Demo-Civic Community Virtues. Sustained pursuit of com-
munity virtues would require basic education about de-
mocratic and communitarian virtues, as well as reinforce-
ment through other less explicit means. LOO 4 focused on 
identifying and utilizing such less explicit modes, such as 
community-based art, to promote and reinforce the vir-
tues required for a strong democratic community. We in-
tended for the public spaces to possess a direct, palpa-
ble, and present civic orientation that reflected commu-
nity strengths, values, and aspirations.31 Philip Bess, a lead-
ing thinker on the importance of strong communities to 
democracy, further described the virtues imbued by civic 
arts, saying: 
 The moral life is understood less in terms of being 
obedient to rules than in terms of developing 
various character habits of excellence, or virtues, 
by means of which one is able to pursue and 
achieve the goods and ends specific to any par-
ticular community. Education and success in vir-
tually every type of human practice require the 




I intended for the architectural form, details, and 
art of the Ettihad Complex to help inspire and reinforce 
such community virtues through the education, congre-
gation, and medical facilities. Myself and the contractors 
worked to ensure that this civic structure would serve a 
unifying role in Brick Factory community through the high-
est aspirations in the engineering, architecture, and art 
possible in Balad Ruz, Iraq.33 
  
ARCHITECTUAL TEMPLATES USED TO CREATE THE ETTIHAD 
COMPLEX 
  After identifying the virtues we hoped for Ettihad to 
entail and embrace, myself and the contractors then fo-
cused on determining the complex’s actual form. The 
contractors, their local architect and I conducted an it-
erative process to determine the most fitting and func-
tional structure. First, I communicated the function and 
meaning I envisioned for the project and then the con-
tractors applied Iraqi engineering constraints and their first
-hand knowledge of Iraqi cultural vernacular to refine my 
design. Using this process, we arrived at a plan that would 
translate my demo-civil idea into a structure useful and 
meaningful to the true owners of the complex—the Brick 
Factory population. To render my vision, I used the limited 
information available  to study existing examples of de-
mocratically inspired architecture. Due to an almost com-
plete lack of access to pictures and sketches, I had to use 
examples from my own memory and personal experience 
with architecture. My most vivid mental images were of 
civic-minded structures from my hometown of Asheville, 
N.C. and elsewhere. I used these buildings as examples to 
derive a template for Ettihad's civically-oriented physical 
structure. 
I integrated a number of examples from American 
public architecture to derive the final vision for Ettihad. 
The civic structures I recalled were buildings that embod-
ied the larger aspirations of their respective communi-
ties—sources of civic pride and focal points  for civic as-
pirations.34 I looked to realize similar demo-civic outcomes 
with the Ettihad Complex. I hoped that Ettihad, like great 
pieces of American public architecture, would become 
this generation’s contribution to an ongoing Iraqi conver-
sation about the significance of its burgeoning democ-
ratic institutions.35   
The  Art Deco style was my primary stylistic inspira-
tion for the Ettihad Complex. My intimate knowledge and 
memory of prominent Art Deco civic buildings heavily in-
fluenced this decision. Art Deco, formally known as Art 
Decoratifs, is a compromise between vernacular style, 
which stresses function and the integration of available 
material, and modernism that employs geometric pat-
terns and the exploitation of industrial materials for orna-
ment.36 These industrial materials include metal, concrete, 
and terra cotta. Other traditional materials, such as ce-
ramic tile, were also adapted to the angular, mechanized 
Art Deco aesthetic.37 Ettihad, as I envisioned it, would simi-
larly merge vernacular inclusion of indigenous materials 
and trades while encapsulating the modernist ethos 
through its geometry and industrialized elements. Beyond 
the aesthetic implications, Art Deco’s prominent position 
in American public architecture made the style an appro-
priate exemplar for the Ettihad endeavor. 
The Asheville City Building, completed in 1928, pre-
sents a quintessential example, as product of the local in-
spiration and the civic involvement, of civic Art Deco ar-
chitecture. I hoped to embody similar inspiration in the Et-
tihad Complex design. The Art Deco architect Douglas 
Ellington conceived the Asheville City Building as a break 
with past formulaic styles. Similarly, I enlisted the Iraqi con-
tractors to help design a building to break with previous 
Iraqi architectural modes that were limited to either reli-
gious or overtly Ba’athist glorification. 
  
ETTIHAD CONTRACT PROPOSAL  




tors and I drafted a funding proposal to make this vision a 
reality. Understanding the Coalition procedure for funding 
proposals (maximizing the amount of projects and im-
pacts for limited rebuilding funds) we created a proposal 
to maximize usable area for the unit cost. To make this ba-
sic project proposal fulfill our lofty design vision, we had to 
find ways to free up monies by reducing basic building 
costs. We would then dedicate the excess money to the 
accoutrements and details we desired. We planned on 
reducing basic building costs by integrating another com-
munitarian premise—community involvement.  We 
planned to recruit volunteers from the Brick Factory com-
munity to perform support some functions of construction, 
such as mixing concrete, painting, and landscaping. Also, 
we planned to ask the brick factories’ to donate some of 
their most obvious asset—bricks. We assumed that the 
brick factory owners would gladly donate bricks to help 
build a facility to serve their workforce. To free up money 
to complete our vision, we would have to integrate volun-
teers, in-kind donations, and closely manage all aspects 
of construction. With a game plan to maximize all volun-
teer, donation, and monetary resources available, we 
then formalized this outcome in a contract proposal.  
In addition to a contract proposal to cover the full 
cost of the project, the contractors also drafted an alter-
nate contract that included the outside sources discussed 
in case a less expensive project pro forma was required. 
With the proposals in hand, we met with the Coalition 
contracting officer to review our contract proposal. With 
access to 4th Infantry Division’s extensive unallocated re-
construction funds, the Pay Officer quickly approved the 
primary proposal (see Iraq contract proposal). I, as the 
project administrator, was given $49,505 in American cur-
rency to issue to my Iraqi partners as I determined appro-
priate to ensure the project’s satisfactory completion. With 
only about 40 days to complete the entire project, I issued 
the first draft of $10,000 so the contractors initiated work 
immediately. 
  
ETTIHAD CONSTRUCTION : INTRODUCTION TO THE FOUR 
FACETS  
Once our contract proposal received funding, we 
turned our full attention to the project itself. We identified, 
weighed, and integrated many competing considerations 
throughout the course of the project. As contracted funds 
became available by reducing costs in one area, we di-
rected unused funds to enhance other design aspects. 
What follows is an account of the considerations and ad-
ditions that occurred during the project to realize our ini-
tial vision. These adjustments are grouped  into four con-
struction facets that represent the physical realizations of 
the respective four civic development LOOs laid out dur-
ing project planning and design. These four facets follow 
a narrowing progression, from the general site location to 
the most finite architectural aspects of Ettihad’s construc-
tion. 
 
FACET ONE: SITE SELECTION AND LAYOUT 
The first and most important facet of the Ettihad 
Complex’s construction plan was site selection and de-
The Asheville City Building served as my 
primary example  for designing the façade 
and details  of the Ettihad Complex. The City 
Building was designed by architect Douglas 
Ellington and completed in 1928. As with 
many public buildings in this era, the City 
Building was designed in the Art Deco style, 
focusing on integration of local materials and 
locally inspired motifs. Through incorpora-
tion of regionally specific themes, the City 
Building, like many public Art Deco struc-
tures, communicates the prominence of civic 





Figure 2. Memorandum 
stating the mission of the 
Ettihad project and au-
thorizing the contractors 
to solicit donations of 
brick from brick factories 




Figures 4 and 5.  Pages 2 and 3 of the Ettihad contract proposal with itemized material requirement list, including total cost of the project, $49,505, 




velopment. We selected a location that best served the 
population in greatest need—the Brick Factory workforce 
and families. But, we also sought to select a site accessi-
ble to surrounding Iraqis that, although not part of the 
Brick Factory population, had very similar needs. Two 
main factors dictated the site location: environment and 
accessibility. Environment an considerations required se-
lecting a site that would minimize the users’ exposure to 
the brick factories’ harmful externalities. Since the flat ter-
rain provided little topographic differentiation between 
possible sites, prevailing wind patterns and groundwater 
quality were the primary site determinants. Although the 
wind was not an obvious factor for location, the brick fac-
tories’ noxious smoke exhaust made the impacts of pre-
vailing wind patterns on the site primary concerns. We 
therefore decided we needed to locate the Ettihad site 
generally upwind of the brick factories. The Ettihad site 
would also include a well, requiring a location far enough 
from the brick factories to ensure dumped crude oil did 
not leach into the well water. In an area so plagued by 
environmental abuse and toxic dumping, mitigation of 
environmental health threats was fundamental to creat-
ing a vibrant and healthy community node. 
The second major factor in site selection was ac-
cessibility. The site, if properly selected, would allow ac-
cess by both the Brick Factory population and the families 
scattered across the adjacent area. Local movement 
patterns along the major east-west transportation route 
and an arterial road into the Brick Factory area helped us 
identify a site that would best serve the Brick Factory resi-
dents and surrounding families. We also considered the 
impact of local culture and Iraq-specific movement pat-
terns. Since many of the families in Iraq could not afford 
their own automobiles, they had devised an informal sys-
tem, similar to a jitney system, to allow rural travel. Jitneys 
are personally negotiated rides that are sometimes free, 
like hitchhiking, and sometimes for monetary or barter 
fare. The major road intersection about three kilometers 
north of  the Brick Factories, where the arterial met the 
main east-west route, served as a major exchange point 
for such jitney traffic (see map on page 27). After careful 
examination of all factors, we selected a site that was up-
wind of the Brick Factory, removed from well water con-
taminants, and close enough to transportation routes to 
take advantage of existing movement patterns. 
Once we selected the site, we then considered the 
site layout. While, many of the site layout requirements 
were prescribed by the approved contract proposal, we 
still had to consider the most economical and useful ar-
rangement to accommodate each of the uses—school, 
clinic, and community meeting hall—included in the plan. 
The floor plan and arrangement of structural elements 
would greatly influence the activities and associations of 
the users. The success of our layout as a public space de-
pended on its ability to promote and support the civic ac-
tivities and associations we intended .  We started with 
the school, which required six classrooms and administra-
tive offices. We designed a floor plan to maximize the 
number of adjacent classrooms and thereby minimize the 
major cost factor in Iraqi construction—the walls. Addi-
tionally, the elongated arrangement, with courtyard-
facing doors, would help direct the noise and motion as-
sociated with school activity into the open courtyard, in-
stead of reverberating in an enclosed building. 
During layout design, we also considered the 
courtyard’s importance for supporting socialization and 
recreation. The outdoor spaces, such as Ettihad’s planned 
courtyard, are often important in climates and societies 
like Iraq where outdoor gathering is integral to public 
life.38 While simply including a courtyard alone would not 
guarantee public use, the courtyard’s position within the 
site could help promote use and interaction. Throughout 
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*Using Kevin Lynch’s five elements 
of development: 
Taken from Kevin Lynch’s book Image of the City  
 
 
We proposed the Ettihad  Complex so that the children who labored in the shadows of the  brick factories 
and under the perpetually gray sky would have more and better opportunities. With better education and 
employment possibilities they would not need the fundamentalism and fanaticism that threatened the new 
democracy in Iraq. 
 
 











Clinic Areas 2 
School Administration 3 
Meeting Hall 1 
Covered Patio Area 5 8 
Stairs to Roof 6 Women’s Restroom 9 
Classrooms 4 Courtyard 7 
FRONT ELEVATION Men’s Restroom 
 
 
The smooth structural lines and geometric forms of the Ettihad Com-
plex reflected the project’s rational intent, while the vivid colors 




and materials to suggest and support particular uses. We 
understood the quality of the space’s use and interaction 
depended heavily on how well we arranged and fur-
nished this public space.39   To this end, we laid out the 
school, clinic, and meeting hall facilities in an L-shape to 
enable users of both the school and meeting hall to flow 
into the courtyard space. With the building layout set, we 
then focused on the engineering required, based on the 
Iraqi materials and methods available, to render our lay-
out design. 
 
FACET TWO: ENGINEERING 
 The second construction facet focused on the en-
gineering considerations required to marry our site layout 
with the project vision. I understood, through my own ex-
periences, how high design could affirm the role of civic 
buildings. Based on this knowledge, I implored the Iraqi 
contractors to integrate the engineering required to make 
our vision a reality. We had to think innovatively to exe-
cute the vision and layout design within the limitations of 
Iraqi materials, methods, and cost constraints. The class-
rooms, as the most intensively used areas,  were our first 
consideration. The rooms were designed to each be four 
meters long by five meters wide. These dimensions were 
determined by a basic Iraqi engineering constraint: the 
longest supported span for Iraqi reinforced concrete ceil-
ing was five meters. The wing of school rooms were ori-
ented east-west so that the doors and windows would 
face north and south. This would minimize the amount of 
induction heat from direct sun 
light shining through the windows. 
While utility and feasibility dictated 
the school portion’s engineering, 
our civic vision for the meeting hall 
required more intricate and so-
phisticated engineering.  
Although Ettihad’s school 
and clinic portions would likely ex-
perience the most intense use, we 
intended the meeting hall would 
serve as Ettihad’s capstone. To 
create this focal point, the gather-
ing hall would incorporate the 
most extensive sampling of engi-
neering techniques and aesthetic applications. We first 
had to consider the meeting hall’s dimensions. We recog-
nized that generous and inviting meeting spaces were im-
portant for encouraging the intended community gather-
ings and democratic development. We decided to make 
the hall as spacious as possible using the existing construc-
tion limitations. The hall would be six meters wide, the 
longest unsupported span that local engineering methods 
would accommodate. The hall’s length would be fifteen 
meters to help create the extensive meeting space we 
desired. We designed the wall height of four meters (a full 
meter higher than an average room) to reflect the 
uniqueness of this space by promoting spatial openness 
and perception of possibility. To further accentuate the 
hall’s openness and progressive form, I pushed the con-
tractors to explore the feasibility of incorporating an 
arched roof. After extensive research and input, we found 
that only one Iraqi company could fabricate the arched 
trusses required within our budget constraints. But, these 
light steel trusses would not support the standard rein-
forced concrete roof. This required the contractors to in-
stead use an insulated aluminum roof with a much lower 
distributed load than reinforced concrete.  
The final engineering aspect focused on cooling 
this large space. To support productive gatherings in Iraq’s Figure 6. Curved trusses supporting the aluminum and insulation 




Figure 7. Emplacement of community 
center air conditioning units to maxi-




I intended the arched trusses, like the upward-curving buttresses and other geometric 
forms of the Ettihad Complex, to serve as a counterpoint to the septic conditions of the 




hot climate, the meeting 
space needed to be  
comfortable. Rather than 
positioning air conditioner 
inlets at the standard in-
window height, we de-
signed the hall so that we 
could mount the units on 
the adjoining ceiling with 
inlets at the top of the 
meeting hall space. This 
air input location would 
increase the air circula-
tion by allowing the heavier cool air to descend and mix 
with the warm air (see figure 7). In an Iraqi climate where 
the average temperature was well over 100 degrees, air 
conditioning design was not a trivial matter. While this en-
gineering aspect was less visible, it would likely determine 
the meeting hall’s usability more than any other single de-
sign or engineering facet.  
   
FACET THREE: ARCHITECTURE 
 If the site and engineering were Ettihad’s skeleton, 
the architecture and art would be the muscles and fea-
tures making Ettihad a meaningful embodiment of the 
communitarian ethos.  Appropriate, noble, dignified, and 
accessible civic architecture has been essential to Ameri-
cans’ democratic well being as citizens and as a soci-
ety.40 Such places of virtue, inspiration, and accessibility 
would also support Iraq’s infant democracy. We intended 
for Ettihad to serve as such an open, inviting showcase for 
community speaking, acting, and leading. The complex 
would, through its layout, architecture, and art, promote 
pursuit of truth and knowledge, as well as reflect a newly 
found civic role.41 To successfully initiate community dia-
logue, Ettihad needed a form both suggesting and rein-
forcing demo-civil aspirations. To do accomplish this, we 
conceived and applied bold treatments for Ettihad’s 
spaces, surfaces, and details. Thomas Barrie summarized 
the importance of these aesthetic aspects for the overall 
quality of the space, saying: 
Architectural form and space is not appre-
hended by sight only. The feel and texture of mate-
rials and surfaces, the sounds of echoes and foot-
steps, are all part of a complete architectural ex-
perience.42 
 The process to conceive and execute a cohesive 
architecture for Ettihad started with the biggest composi-
tional blocks and continued to the specific details. We 
designed the exterior form, proceeded to the interior 
form, and then finally culminated with the architectural 
and artistic details. Definition of the exterior started with 
structural lines to reflect the Ettihad project’s modern vi-
sion. We integrated curved lines into the exterior silhou-
ette with upward arching lines from the ground, through 
the buttresses, up to the community center’s arched roof. 
My own knowledge of American architectural examples, 
such as the Asheville City Building’s Art Deco styling, in-
spired this arched roof line. Douglas Ellington, architect of 
the Asheville City Building, explained that the building was 
constructed “with the desire to have a structure emerge 
from the ground in fortress-like strength and ascend to its 
full height with a sense of verticality and inevitability.” 43   
Just as American court house builders were often very in-
dependent in their incorporation and combination of ex-
isting forms, I imagined the Ettihad form as a combination 
of various stylistic and architectural elements. 
The specific architectural elements, as the most in-
tricate units of significance within the architectural prod-
uct, would provide detail for Ettihad’s overall form.44 We 
Figure 8. The structure’s smooth, geometric 
lines reinforcing the rational and progres-





USE OF REGIONALLY INSPIRED 
COLOR MOTIF 
Just as the Asheville City Building incor-
porated a color progression that mim-
icked the layers of mountain earth, the 
Ettihad façade incorporated a motif remi-
niscent of the ground to sky color pro-
gression of the Iraqi horizon. 
HANDCRAFTED ORNATE 
DOORS 
In the Asheville City Building, large 
hand-made doors were used to create 
imposing entrances to reflect the 
grand civic activities within. The 
Ettihad Complex main portals also 
incorporated ornate doors to signal 
the grand role of the building. 
ORNATE TREATMENT OF DOORS  
AND WINDOWS 
The Ettihad Community Center design integrated 
uniquely shaped windows and entryways, containing 
stained-glass windows and transoms, that borrowed 
heavily from the ornate treatments of the Art Deco style. 
J & S Building 
Asheville City Building 
ART DECO INSPIRATION FOR ETTIHAD DETAILS 
The Asheville City Hall and J& S Building in Asheville, NC were both designed by architect 
Douglas Ellington in the late 1920s.  
ARCHED FRONT  
ENTRANCES 
The arched front entries of the Etti-
had Building work to denote them 
as special, having a purpose greater 




intended to integrate the structural detailing into the 
complete structure to demonstrate the materials’ charac-
teristics and qualities. We hope that our integration of de-
tails would articulate our design decisions and delineate a 
hierarchy between the individual elements and the 
whole. The success of Ettihad’s architecture depended on 
selection and integration of appropriate details to render 
a structure with beauty and meaning.45 We planned for 
the details, consisting of objects handcrafted by local arti-
sans from local materials, to reflect the building’s local 
and populist character. Incorporation of locally-inspired 
motifs also followed patterns in American civil architec-
ture.  For the Asheville City Building, the architect inte-
grated the most prevalent element, a general feather 
motif, to be lightly reminiscent of the Indian epoch that 
was a major local cultural influence. For American court-
houses and city halls, the true clients, beyond the over-
seeing commissions, were the citizens. The most meaning-
ful public buildings, through details and renderings, reflect 
the citizens’ cultural narratives and values. The Ettihad 
structure’s ability to successfully inspire demo-civil prac-
tices depended on our ability to incorporate details  
meaningful to the Iraqi clients—the Brick Factory popula-
tion. 
 As the most prominent exterior details, the but-
tresses integrated upward curving lines, creating ascen-
sion from ground to sky. When I suggested this form, I envi-
sioned that the building’s upward rise from the Iraqi earth 
would symbolize the community and democracy arising 
from the local population. These buttresses were also inte-
grated to imbue a sense of strength and stability for the 
structure and the civic spirit Ettihad was intended to en-
case. The buttresses were the first and most visible ele-
ments of a façade that we designed to inspire and sus-
tain community pride and unity. 
The doors were the next of the façade’s prominent 
features—the symbolic portals to the democracy and 
possibilities within.46 The treatment of these openings 
would provide important cues to the observer about the 
activities conducted inside. The design for Ettihad’s pri-
mary entrance, to signify the entrance’s importance, was 
the most detailed. We planned for this entryway to pro-
vide a portal that was both taller and wider than the av-
erage door. This enhanced size would signify the entry’s 
importance and beckon to people to the prominent 
space within. This entry would include ornate and hand-
crafted double doors denoting Ettihad as a unique and 
central community landmark. To further accentuate the 
importance of this portal, we incorporated an arced tran-
som filled with stained glass panes. We also designed the 
additional front entry to provide access to the school. 
While the alternate entry would be smaller, to indicate its 
subordinate role, this portal would also contain a special 
crafted door and stained glass transom. We planned for 
these doors, with the rest of the front façade, to present a 
meaningful front and allude to Ettihad’s role in the Brick 
Factory community. 
We planned for the windows of the meeting hall to 
also reinforce the uniqueness of the structure. Rather than 
employing standard square windows, we commissioned a 
local craftsman to fabricate uniquely shaped windows. 
These windows would be filled with stained glass to help 
create a unique and impressive facade. I encouraged 
this detailing because the intricate use of stained glass 
was reminiscent of the mosaic tiling and coloring integral 
to the Art Deco structures I knew and respected. We in-
tended these windows, like the doors, to serve as integral 
exterior elements signifying the progressive activities within 
the meeting hall. 
We planned to tie all of the façade elements to-
gether by applying a complementary exterior color 




Figure 10. Progressive themed murals in the Ettihad courtyard. 
architectural facades by employing creative coloring 
and materials, we intended apply a unique color scheme 
to the Ettihad Complex’s façade. With the exception of 
religious structures and Saddam’s Nationalist bastions, 
Iraqi buildings generally received only basic treatments. 
Since only a limited range of colors were available lo-
cally , we selected an exterior scheme that made best 
use of these available colors. Taking inspiration from the  
from the rich earth to blue sky progression of Iraqi vistas, 
we painted the building in a pink hue and colored the 
roof light blue.  This exterior color scheme was inspired by  
the Asheville City Building’s exterior coloring. The archi-
tect, Douglas Ellington, had designed the Asheville City 
Building “with the idea in mind of having the general con-
tours of the building reflect, in so far as it was possible, its 
general environment, and at the same time approximate 
in color the local terrain.”47 Our facade coloring would 
suggest to the community and all passersby that this struc-
ture, with its progressive form, promoted and supported 
activities essential to promoting community involvement 
in the new Iraq. 
 
To complement the exterior design, the contractors 
and I turned our subsequent efforts to creating an equally 
thoughtful and inspiring interior treatment. We sought to 
shape interior spaces that would incite regular and wide-
spread community participation.48 We engineered and 
designed the meeting hall’s interior space to transmit 
openness and possibility. To further accentuate the open-
ness of the high, arched ceiling, we adopted a paint 
scheme to further suggest openness and possibility. Treat-
ing the walls with a bottom-to-top, darker-to-lighter color 
progression help create the desired feeling of openness. 
The advancing color, appearing closer to the observer, 
below the more retreating color, appearing farther away, 
would help create a sense of opening. This interior treat-
ment would help Ettihad fulfill a crucial role of public ar-
chitecture in a democracy—providing a public space 
that inviting, encouraging, and supporting civic interac-






Figure 9. Progressive mural depicting community interaction and en-
gagement in the Ettihad Meeting Hall. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 7 8 9 10 
14 15 13 11 12 
16 17 18 
(1) Sorting bricks for foundation  (2) Measuring foundation  (3) Contractors reading building plans (4) Tractor filling foundation  (5) Work-
ers mixing concrete (6) Workers building walls  (7) Iraqi construction workers  (8) Measuring door openings  (9) Unfinished buttresses  
(10) Delivery of reinforcing bar for roof  (11) Framing window openings  (12) Unfinished meeting hall exterior  (13) Forms for concrete 
roof  (Laying reinforcing bar for concrete roof ) (15) Building materials (16) Unfinished courtyard with workers  (17) Meeting hall with un-




The painted Ettihad Building prior to 




Local children playing at the completed Balad Ruz Children’s Park 
 
 
 We envisioned the second portion of C Troop's 
civic development efforts as a response to the glaring 
lack of safe locations for the children of Balad Ruz. A large 
swing sat idle in the muddy and refuse-covered central 
open area in Balad Ruz. With the bolts removed, the swing 
was of no benefit to the children. Instead, the children 
swung on loose restricting cables hanging from the 
nearby water tower .  
 Through discussions with local residents, we learned 
why the limited recreation equipment set unused. A local 
businessman owned the swing and would reconnect the 
swing set for a few days each month and charge the lo-
cal kids to use it. This example highlighted the Balad Ruz 
children's need for a safe recreational area accessible to 
all. With the input of local leaders, we started considering 
ways to create a public recreation space where the 
Balad Ruz Children could safely congregate and play. 
  
BALAD RUZ CONDITIONS 
 Numerous factors led to the town’s glaring lack of  
safe and healthy recreation areas. The first factor was 
Saddam Hussein's lack of funding for basic development 
in Balad Ruz, a town that consisted of large Shia’a, Kurd-
ish, and Turkomen contingents. This area, unlike the pre-
dominately Sunni areas of Western Iraq, did not appeal to 
Saddam’s Sunni ethnic preference. As a result, the town 
rarely received the funding or development projects that 
equivalent Sunni cities garnered. This lack of funding was 
especially evidenced by the lack of community amenities 
such as soccer fields or inviting public spaces. Balad Ruz, 
a very dense city, was bracketed to the north and south 
by large canals that restricted pedestrian movement into 
more rural areas in pursuit of safe recreation. The canals’ 
constricting effect meant left the town’s children to seek 
recreation in vacant, garbage strewn lots. Based on feed-
back from the local population, I recognized the need to 
address these planning issues as part of C Troop’s civic 
development campaign.  
  
VISION FOR THE CHILDREN’S PARK  
The impetus for this project, like the Ettihad Com-
plex, emanated from my personal experience and famili-
arity with urban planning. Growing up in Asheville, North 
Carolina, a town that made extensive use of Carter Ad-
ministration funding and incentives for development of 
recreation spaces, I experienced the benefits of develop-
ing unbuildable areas, such as floodplains, as playgrounds 
and recreational spaces.   
Development of urban parks and shared spaces in 
Balad Ruz could help foster four societal virtues. The first 
two virtues are related to well-being—public health and 
prosperity. The second two compose the normative vir-
tues of social coherence and democratic equality. 
Through the development of recreational areas in Balad 
Ruz we could help make the town’s population healthier, 
wealthier, more-crime free, and more democratic.51 The 
park would promote public health by softening the rough 
edges of the city, providing a safe and clean area dedi-
cated to child congregation and recreation. Such civic 
development would also support local economic devel-
opment by utilizing locally purchased materials and em-
ploying local laborers.  
Playgrounds, especially those used by urban poor 
and ethnic populations, often foster social coherence 
and help deter crime through youth training.52 Formal rec-




I selected the site for the Balad Ruz Children’s 
Park based on its central location in town, I in-
tended for the park to become a neighbor-
hood node at the intersection of the four 
major routes into town and proximate to 
three schools that educated all the kids of 
Balad Ruz. The park provided a safe, 
clean open space for children re-
stricted from the surrounding country-
side by the large canals . 
LEGEND 
Balad Ruz Children’s Park 
Major Canals  
(at least 20’ wide) 
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and promoting Iraq’s new pluralism and democracy. Chil-
dren could both learn and demonstrate pluralism and so-
cial coherence through their naturally-occurring play ac-
tivities. The Balad Ruz Children’s Park would provide a 
dedicated and safe setting for these activities. Beyond 
the obvious benefits of providing a place for Iraqi children 




The first step in the “Park Project” development 
process was selecting a suitable location. For the park to 
be successful, it had to be, like any successful public 
space, readily accessible and integrated into the existing 
use and movement patterns. The best candidate was the 
low, muddy area near the center of town where children 
already congregated and played.  
The park site, once improved, would enable sev-
eral positive impacts. The first, in keeping with LOO 3 
(development of community health, welfare, and recrea-
tion), was to provide a safe, sanitary locale for kids to con-
gregate and play. Although the site would require work to 
raise and solidify a solid play surface, it was adjacent to 
the largest traffic circle in town, providing maximum ac-
cessibility. The site also sat in close proximity to the two 
major schools, which supported the park’s integration into 
the children’s existing movement and use patterns. The 
park’s central location would also allow passersby to ob-
serve public interaction and pluralism in progress. The chil-
dren, by naturally associating and interacting, would pro-
vide a visual reminder to reinforce the positive changes 
brought by pluralism and democracy.  
CONSTRUCTING THE CHILDREN’S PARK 
With the best site identified, we then considered 
how to create a meaningful demo-civic space with the 
resources available. Due to limited funds, our initial con-
cept included only a crushed-brick surface and the exist-
ing swing set. Upon further investigation, I found that a 
nearby Coalition base had unused stores of lumber origi-
nally intended for constructing additional bunkers. After 
consolidating this new lumber and recycled lumber from 
other sources at our forward operating base (FOB), I 
worked with our partner Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) 
soldiers to construct playground equipment from the ma-
terials (see page 45 for an overview of the park construc-
tion process). Mimicking standard American playground 
structures, we created a design that utilized the lumber to 
build a slide, a bridge, and balance beam. The soldiers of 
C Troop then contributed money to purchase the screws, 
sheet metal, poles, and chain link fencing required to 
complete the design. 
 During the construction process, I requested and 
was granted $2500 in Coalition money to fund additional 
park development and  increase the space’s potential for 
positive impact. To clearly delineate the park as a unique 
space with a specific purpose, we set aside a portion of 
the funds to build a ornamental and gate for the park. 
The fence, consisting of brick pillars with rails between, 
was not intended to deny access, but rather to clearly 
mark the park as a special piece of Balad Ruz’s urban 
fabric. We incorporated a gateway into the park to fur-
ther designate the Children's’ Park. This passageway, with 
two tall pillars supporting an ornate metal archway, would 
clearly signify the entrance to this unique civic space (see 
Figures 11 and 12 ). Once the playground components 
were erected on the site, the perimeter fencing and gate 




 Only a few days before C Troop's planned depar-
ture from the Balad Ruz area, this unique project was 
completed. C Troop, local ICDC, and local leaders had 
marshaled limited resources to complete a community 
development project specifically designed o serve the 
least empowered of the population—the children. 
Figures 11(above) and 12 (left). Ornate ironwork from a local artisan 




 (1) ICDC soldier helping fabricate playground equipment at C Troop’s Forward Operating Base. 
(2)Playground equipment being fabricated prior to erection at the downtown site for the park.  
(3) Playground equipment during installation 
(4) Completed playground with the brick surfacing and ornate fence  
 
 
The Balad Ruz Children’s Park successfully turned previously unusable 




Balad Ruz children standing in front of the Unity  mural depicting an 
Arab, Kurd, and Turkomen joining together to build a new community. 
Other murals commission as part of the Balad Ruz Mural Project (right). 
 
 
The third and final project, although funded as 
components of the Ettihad and Balad Ruz Children's’ Park 
contracts, employed more artistic mediums than Ettihad 
or the Park Project. The “Murals Project” sought to rein-
force democratic and pluralist themes through art.  This 
program would consist of a series of murals at the Ettihad 
Complex and in Balad Ruz depicting communitarian, plu-
ralist, and democratic themes. Under this project’s aegis 
we commissioned a local artist to paint artistic representa-
tions of socially conscious themes that would support ac-
complishment of LOO 4 by suggest and reinforce demo-
civic values through public art. This application of art to 
communicate and reinforce positive themes was not a 
completely new idea. The Mexican muralists and the New 
Deal art projects had both employed arts to depict popu-
list themes. These murals had originated during periods of 
societal challenges and social reorganization compara-
ble to the reform that was then occurring across Iraq.  Like 
previous populist art, members of this population could 
create meaningful art to convey socially meaningful 
themes to communities that now considered the prospect 
of pluralism and democracy. 
  
HISTORICAL TEMPLATE FOR IRAQI MURALS 
Following the fall of Saddam’s Ba’athist regime, the 
conditions in the Balad Ruz and Brick Factory areas resem-
bled many of the conditions that had accompanied the 
periods of great populist art in Mexico and New Deal 
America. In Mexico, the people had been restive under a 
system of favoritism, dispossession, and ruthless political 
control. These conditions heartened the artists that de-
picted and participated in the national, political, racial, 
agrarian, social, cultural, and educational revolution that 
followed.53 This encompassing revolution (or at least 
“restoration” to a previously viable state) was the change 
that Coalition envisioned for the new Iraq. The far-
reaching Mexican reforms had not simply been moti-
vated by a few artists, but rather were encouraged by 
some radical government officials. These progressive bu-
reaucrats had questioned how a revolution without an 
explicitly defined ideology could rise from the years of vio-
lent chaos to create a new consolidated government. 
They started defining this ascending ideology by initiating 
a massive public relations campaign. The new Mexican 
president’s cabinet members, especially the Secretary of 
Public Education, had promoted a vision of a government 
that would take care of its citizens, educate them, and 
raise their standard of living.54  
We sought to promote and support this same type 
of benevolent administration until the new Iraqi govern-
ment could sustain their democratic political and civil sys-
tems unaided. Development of a newly democratic and 
pluralist Iraq required the presentation and acceptance 
of socially coherent images of a united Iraq. I intended 
this set of commissioned murals to function as part of a 
wider communications strategy to present and promote 
such coherent messages of unity, pluralism, and democ-
racy.  
In Depression-era America, President Roosevelt’s 
New Deal programs had created initiatives to employ art-
ists and create art embodying national ideals.55 The larg-
est program, the Works Progress Administration (WPA) pur-
sued these aims by commissioning artist to paint every-
thing from post offices to city walls. I envisioned the Iraqi 
murals as creating art that, like the New Deal art in Amer-
ica, embodied the spirit of portraying virtues through ac-
cessible, populist artworks. Our method for creating these 
murals was more akin to another New Deal art program, 
the Treasury Department’s Section of Fine Arts. This com-
mission was assigned to procure and commission artwork 
to adorn schools, hospitals, public libraries, museums, and 
other tax-supported projects. The Section of Federal Arts 
artists used their program to elevate American art to a 
higher level of social consciousness. The Section adminis-
trators believed in the importance of populist art and the 
essential social fairness of opening its benefits to as many 




ble.56 The Treasury Secretary funded this diffusion of gov-
ernment-funded art, issuing an administrative order that 
allocated one percent of the total cost of each govern-
ment building for artistic embellishment the structures.57 
For the contracts I proposed and supervised, I adopted 
the Treasury Secretary’s method, dedicating a certain 
portion of project funds to civic artwork and populist 
adornment of the public structures and spaces.  
   
VISION FOR MURALS 
 Before commissioning these murals, we had to de-
velop an overarching vision for the artist to interpret and 
create within. To guide our visioning of these murals, I 
looked to other entities that had successfully fostered civic 
art programs. Throughout history, many countries had util-
ized art as an integral instrument to rebuild their respec-
tive societies, mobilize their citizens to support of ambitious 
national goals, and to undercut the lure of non-
constructive movements.58 I envisioned these murals as a 
similar type of mobilization tool for democratic growth in 
Iraq and as a way to undercut the non-compliant, insur-
gent movement in Iraq. Through the visioning process, I 
attempted to combine the socially conscious spirit of the 
Mexican mural movement and the populist methods of 
the WPA and Treasury Department art initiatives to create 
a socially significant concept for these murals. 
Since I was using an explicitly effects
-based approach , my vision 
needed to assess the artworks’ likely 
impact the population. I needed to 
clearly understand how the popula-
tion would determine the artworks’ 
significance so I could effectively 
guide the placement and content of these 
murals (see page 54 for discussion of the 
flaws inherent in this approach and the ac-
cording lessons learned). Carol Aronovici, an 
expert on community building, commented 
Figure 14. Diego Rivera’s Detroit Hall of Industry north mural depicting pro-
gress at the confluence of  labor,  innovation, and modern machinery.70 
 49
Figure 13. William Gropper’s “Construction of a Dam,” 1938. A Works Pro-
gress Administration (WPA) mural for the Department of the Interior, 
Washington, D.C., showing the monumental product of  labor and inge-
EFFECTS-BASED  
APPROACH 
Activities that attempt to  
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desired behavioral effects 
over some period of time. 
 
 
on significant art within the community, say-
ing, The moral and spiritual value of the arts 
assumes its greatest significance when it is 
woven into the daily life of the people. It is a 
moral force which enhances the intimate re-
lations between man and his neighbor, be-
tween man and his civic sense of participa-
tion, achievement, and joy.59  
For the murals to act as the positive force I envisioned, 
they needed to communicate a socially significant im-
perative. These murals’ purpose was to inspire the Iraqi 
population to more inclusive and constructive action by 
depicting how cooperation and hard work would build a 
stronger and more stable Iraq. The murals of Mexican 
revolutionary Diego Rivera, as well as American New Deal 
art, portrayed industrial workers exhibiting the same con-
centration, skill, and dedication Iraqi reconstruction would 
require. The industries represented in traditional murals, 
similar to the industries requiring reconstruction in Iraq, 
were usually heavy ones—steel, mining, lumber, and pro-
duction.60 The Mexican and New Deal mural scenes usu-
ally portrayed men working together rhythmically and in-
tensely. Even the average worker exuded heroic qualities 
beyond strength and prowess.61 Many of the New Deal 
murals encapsulated, in response to the disenfranchise-
ment of the Depression, the New Deal theme “Work 
Makes America.” It was this heroic view of workers build-
ing a new democracy a and a brighter future through 
teamwork that I wanted to encapsulate and promote 
with the Iraqi Mural Project. 
  
COMMISIONING OF MURALS 
  Once I identified the method, the vision, and the 
outcome for this project, myself and my Iraqi counter-
parts could begin the process of commissioning these mu-
rals. Due to the compressed timeline to complete these 
murals, I was not able to review sketches and submissions 
from an array of artists. I commissioned an artist that I had 
initially employed to paint a children's’ scene at the Balad 
Ruz Park to paint these murals. While I hoped the murals 
would embody a similar ethos to the Mexican and New 
Deal artworks, I did not want these murals to simply recre-
ate Western murals and lack intrinsic meaning for the lo-
cal population. To facilitate this local interpretation, I re-
Figures 15 (above) and 16 (below). Ettihad courtyard murals represent-
ing children playing happily together—static models for the real children 




layed basic ideas to the artist that translated demo-civil 
values into Iraqi terms. I then encouraged him use his own 
cultural understanding and artistic sensibilities create ap-
propriately meaningful murals. I wanted these murals to 
be artistic renderings that would demonstrate that by indi-
vidual work, communal work, education and technology 
the new Iraqi democracy, starting at the local level, could 
preserve the best of the past and attain a more abundant 
future. 
 
PRODUCTION OF THE MURALS 
 The first of these murals were to be placed in the 
most visible locale in Balad Ruz (see Balad Ruz Urban Ge-
ography, page 42). The first two murals decorated either 
side of a wall in the middle of the largest traffic circle that 
had once held glorifying vestiges of Saddam Hussein. For 
one side, the artist and I discussed the theme of building a 
new Iraq through cooperation. The other side would pre-
sent a mural portraying pluralist harmony among the nu-
merous divisions of the Balad Ruz population. I intended 
for these two murals to reflect the two most vital aspects 
of successful democracy, inclusion and cooperation, 
which were embodied in the populist ethos of Mexican 
and New Deal muralists. 
I commissioned second set of murals to decorate 
the courtyard of Ettihad Complex. In the courtyard we 
commissioned a series of murals that would support per-
ception a truly communal space.  We intended for these 
murals to depict children participating in focal practices, 
such as interaction and inclusion, which are integral to 
community unity and strength. Cicero, a great Roman 
orator, explained that “art is the food of youth, the charm 
of age, an ornament of prosperity, a refuge and solace of 
adversity.” 62 These murals would adorn the courtyard and 
promote the experience of Cicero’s artistic values for all 
the community members and school children who used it. 
In an area wrought with suffering and disenfranchisement, 
I wanted murals that portrayed these children as the hope 
for a more healthy and verdant community. 
The third segment of the Iraqi Mural Project was to 
be the most ambitious of all of the murals. We planned 
this mural for the meeting hall to serve as a space engi-
neered and designed to be a kind of social blast furnace 
for forging community and democracy. This mural, 
stretching the length of the hall, would provide a life-sized 
depiction of the transition from instability to prosperity 
through communal work and a strong community. I 
sought for this mural sought, through the painter’s interpre-
tation, to create a communitarian interpretation of place 
and the demo-civil virtues required for rejuvenation of the 
Brick  
 The set of murals aimed to perform something a 
structure alone could not—to communicate an immedi-
ately resonant vision of democracy’s therapeutic poten-
tial for the Brick Factory and Balad Ruz  populations. 
Figure 17. Ettihad Community 
Center mural depicting a more 
prosperous future through educa-
tion, hard work, and cooperation. 
Figure 18. Murals painted in Balad 
Ruz’s central traffic circle depicting 
on one side (top) the construction of 







MAJOR CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED 
 While this project describes many physical out-
comes of our reconstruction efforts, these efforts also 
faced internal and external challenges. While understand-
ing the specific design and construction processes is of 
some interest, this project’s greatest value is the lessons 
learned from these processes. Understanding the chal-
lenges and the lessons they impart  can help ongoing and 
future reconstruction efforts avoid similar pitfalls and 
achieve even greater positive impacts. 
Iraqis lacked a well-established tradition of democratic 
ideals or activities to immediately support communitarian 
political and social functions 
I intended for the Ettihad facilities and spaces to 
support and promote democratic community activities 
such as public meetings, pluralist gatherings, and delib-
eration of pertinent issues by the local population. But, the 
Iraqi population I worked for generally lacked the rich and 
established context to understand and value the democ-
ratic concepts, representations, and functions that are 
familiar to most Americans. Although Iraqis have exhibited 
some democratic attitudes and practices in their modern 
history (since gaining independence in 1921), these in-
stances were localized, limited, and generally short-lived. 
Based on Iraq’s autocratic history, most scholars have 
concluded that, in addition to lacking a significant de-
mocratic tradition, Iraq also lacks many of the success 
factors required for democracy now.71 Based on these 
deficiencies, many observers, such as the Government 
Accounting Office (GAO), have predicted that an auto-
cratic regime might be the country’s most likely long-term 
outcome.72, 73  
 For most Americans, our views on social justice, 
community, and equality are tightly fused with our repub-
lic’s democratic and pluralist traditions. For Americans the 
idea of a national community, with common rights, tradi-
tions, and responsibilities, is among the oldest and most 
powerful notions in our collective history—an ethos woven 
into our Constitution.74 I sought to capture this ethos in a 
set of construction projects that, through their processes 
and outcomes, would promote a new, more pluralistic 
Iraqi national identity. By the time of the Great Depression, 
America’s most intense period of democratically-inspired 
architecture, art, and planning, the United States had an 
almost 150-year-old tradition of democratic ideas and ac-
tivities. The Iraqi population I sought to serve had no such 
tradition or construct through which to interpret the art, 
architecture, and planning these projects would produce. 
The concept of a secular and pluralist national 
identity based on democratic ideals did not exist for these 
Iraqis in the concrete form understood by Americans. 
Iraqis were much more likely to identify themselves by reli-
gious grouping ( Sunni, Shia’a, etc.), ethnic delineation 
(Arab, Kurd, or Turkomen), or tribal association (al-Bu Nasir 
tribe, Beijat clan, Majid family, etc.). 75 As an American, I 
applied assumptions during the projects’ conception and 
design that presupposed the appropriateness of Ameri-
can democratic functions, trappings, and meanings for 
this population. The decisions I made during the execution 
of these projects, although advised by Iraqi input, did not 
fully recognize the impact of Iraqi religious and ethnic sen-
sibilities on how the population would view and experi-
ence the planning, architecture, and art projects I pro-
posed.  
During these projects I encountered the hazards 
that “liberators” commonly face when assuming a popu-
lation is both immediately willing and “fully capable of 
moving toward democracy and living in freedom.”76 I su-




sensibilities and assumptions on a population with few 
positive examples of community interaction, much less 
any established democratic tradition. While this popula-
tion definitely desired a brand of individual freedom and 
collective community, we could not correctly presume 
that they associated these desires exclusively with West-
ern democratic modes and representations. 
Due to my limited exposure to regionally and culturally 
significant modes of art, architecture and planning, I inte-
grated western forms and modes that had limited or con-
flicted meaning for Iraqis  
With very limited access to guiding information on 
Arabic aesthetic methods and themes, I based many of 
the projects’ art, architecture, and design determinations 
on my own knowledge and sensibilities. This knowledge 
originated from my own exposure to civic architecture, 
art, and planning. While these design and planning con-
siderations might have transmitted their intended mean-
ing in a Western context, the forms, images, and symbols 
likely did not carry corresponding significance within the 
local culture.  These projects’ vernacular and symbolism, 
by primarily channeling Western influences, probably car-
ried differing and possibly contrary meanings for the Iraqi 
population. In this case, my western sensibilities proved of 
limited value and resonance when attempting to create 
spaces and structures to promote and support community 
functions in Iraq. 
During the formative stages of the civic develop-
ment projects, especially Ettihad, I worked closely with 
contractors to conceive pieces of civic art, architecture, 
and planning that would resonate with the local popula-
tion. During these deliberations and revisions, we dis-
cussed a vision for Ettihad’s form and facets. While I tried 
to draw on the contractors’ culturally-specific knowledge 
of civic architecture, they possessed limited knowledge of 
modes and forms beyond modest local examples. In a 
country that had previously limited grand architecture 
and design to religious sites or structures glorifying Sad-
dam, no tradition of quality civic spaces existed in periph-
eral areas such as Balad Ruz. I therefore inserted my per-
sonal knowledge of Western architecture and democratic 
spaces to inspire and direct the projects’ design. The out-
come resulted in a collection of architectural and artistic 
projects that conveyed themes likely more meaningful to 
Americans than to an Iraqi population unfamiliar with the 
structures and symbols of democratically inspired archi-
tecture.  
Carol Aronovinci, a prominent researcher on the 
importance of cultural meaning in design, spoke to the 
need for designs rooted in local vernacular, stating:   
All design, whether it be applied to a build-
ing or a city, is a human document which 
interprets, or should interpret, the temper of 
the people, their traditions, their back-
ground, their sense of human values, and 
their capacity to respond emotionally to 
certain stimuli of form, color, texture, and 
mass.77 
The forms, colors, textures, and masses I elected to use, 
while clearly signally a break with Iraqi autocratic tradi-
tions, likely differed too greatly from Iraqi cultural mean-
ing, and tradition to effectively transmit the communi-
tarian, democratic, and pluralist messages I in-
tended. Better integration of forms and symbols meaning-
ful to Iraqis would have increased the projects’ long-term 
potential to promote community development and de-
mocratic growth. One key improvement would have 
been employment of traditional symbolic and “non-
iconic” ornamentation and art preferred by Arabs as op-




often depicted in Western, democratically-inspired art.78, 
79 A more culturally appropriate approach would have 
merged familiar Iraqi themes with progressive ideals com-
mon to Western democratic expressions in order to create 
outcomes rooted in vernacular tradition but heralding 
new democratic aspirations. Despite the projects’ separa-
tion from established Iraqi cultural meanings, the projects 
did succeed at transmitting progressive intentions that 
transcended traditional cultural expressions and reflected 
expectations for positive change. 
 
My limited knowledge of Arab artistic and architectural 
traditions, as well as Iraqi building vernacular, limited the 
potential of my Ettihad design to support democratic and 
pluralist themes and activities  
  During the design and construction of the Ettihad 
project, I worked closely with the Iraqi contractors, meet-
ing with them regularly to discuss the status of design and 
construction. During these meetings we developed a vi-
sion for the Ettihad’s form and design. Our desire to make 
this building’s architectural and aesthetic form match its 
progressive purpose motivated the extensive attention we 
dedicated to design. While the contractors agreed with 
this vision, they were not always able to expertly inform 
the design decisions. The lack of any tradition for visible 
civic architecture in the area limited the contractors’ abil-
ity to conceptualize and design a building with such inspi-
rational aspirations.80 By default, my knowledge of West-
ern civic architecture and design became our primary 
architectural guide.  
Although we did integrate some handcrafted de-
tails by local artisans, such as metalwork and stained-
glass, integration of more vernacular modes would have 
helped further transmit appropriate cultural meanings. 
While I could have possibly found examples of such detail-
ing in places like designs that adorn Iraqi currency and 
prominent examples of Arab architecture, we had no sig-
nificant examples of civic-oriented design to integrate. 
Despite the Iraqi contractors’ limited experience design-
ing meaningful civic architecture and my limited exposure 
to Arab architecture, art, and planning traditions, we 
were still able to create a progressive structure to pro-
mote health, stability, and progress in the Brick Factory 
community. 81 
 
Ettihad Complex’s site location beyond the community’s 
geographic edges limited its potential to serve as a cen-
tral node and landmark in the community 
Both physical and human geographies heavily im-
pacted selection of project site locations, especially Etti-
had. Based on a purely spatial analysis, The Brick Factory 
District’s dense conglomeration of factories and inter-
spersed residences clearly defined a district within which 
Ettihad could serve as a node. But, the noxious external-
ities (exhaust smoke, oil spillage) associated with the brick 
factories made any location within the district extremely 
unhealthy and untenable for the planned school-
community center-clinic complex and the associated ar-
tesian well. These environmental hazards required us to 
select a site beyond the edges of the district that was pre-
dominantly upwind of the factories. The best site away 
from the brick factories’ smoke and contamination of the 
district was along the road into the Brick Factory District 
that served as the primary path into and through the dis-
trict. While the selected site maximized the benefit of the 
existing movement patterns, the lack of centrality for intra-
district movement limited the Ettihad’s potential to de-





While these location determinants were specific to 
the Brick Factory District, similar factors exist for many lo-
cales in Iraq and other developing areas. Due to the gen-
eral absence of zoning or administration to govern the 
placement and externalities of noxious activities in devel-
oping countries, modern community design preferences 
may not be tenable or preferable.82 As the project admin-
istrator, I had responsibility for the final site location deter-
mination. I had to balance the importance of Ettihad as a 
literal community center and the need to mitigate the 
noxious impacts on an already disenfranchised popula-
tion. In order to determine or approve sites for develop-
ment and reconstruction projects, civil development ad-
ministrators must understand the basic community struc-
ture and how the considered projects fit within these exist-
ing components to either support or detract from commu-
nity use.   
 
Arab cultural aversion to physical labor limited the in-
volvement of Iraqi volunteer labor in the Ettihad construc-
tion process83 and rendered some mural representations 
impertinent 
I intended to promote community identification by 
using the Ettihad construction process to incite local in-
vestment of social capital and resources. I expected that 
volunteer participation by local residents could augment 
the paid construction workers by conducting manual 
tasks such as painting and cleaning. My template for this 
idea was American programs that offer communities ma-
terials and funding that was contingent on some labor or 
resource input from the benefitting community. For the 
Ettihad project, I expected that such local participation 
would reduce building costs and free unused funds in the 
contract for dedication to additional building improve-
ments. My efforts to incite such participation proved al-
most completely fruitless.  
This unwillingness of Arabs to engage in physical labor, al-
though often viewed as simple insularity, actually has 
deep and rational roots in Arabs’ Bedouin traditions. While 
Americans of moderate socio-economic status actually 
like to engage in manual activities, such as landscaping 
or tinkering, Arabs of similar socio-economic standing not 
only dislike it, but actually consider it demeaning.84 For Ar-
abs, based on their Bedouin cultural foundations, the no-
tion of engaging in manual labor of any sort is loath-
some.85 Simply put, physical work is a curse to Arabs. 
Based on this cultural reality, I could not have reasonably 
expected the local population to engage in or receive 
inspiration from activities they view as demeaning, cursed, 
and to be avoided if at all possible.  
This prohibition not only doomed my efforts to inte-
grate community volunteers, but also made many of the 
commissioned murals appear unrealistic and impertinent 
to the local population. For one of the commissioned mu-
rals I actually suggested the theme of “working together 
to build a new Iraq”, which depicted a laborer laying 
bricks in the shape of a new Iraq. My knowledge of art-
work from America and other developed countries that 
glorify labor and modernism inspired this recommenda-
tion.86 In light of Arab culture’s demonization of the artistic 
depiction of humans and aversion of physical labor, this 
highly-visible mural was likely an irreverent and inappropri-
ate display for inspiring local cooperation. 
 
The Brick Factory population lacked the basic income 
and stability required to enable voluntary community par-





Amitai Etzioni, a leading Communitarian thinker, 
noted that once material needs are sated and securely 
provided for, additional income does not directly result in 
additional happiness. On the contrary, evidence shows 
more contentment is found in nourishing ends-based rela-
tionships, such as bonding with others, community build-
ing, and public service, as well as in cultural and spiritual 
pursuits.87 These are the relationships and pursuits I in-
tended to engender through the Ettihad Complex’s con-
struction and use. But, as Etzioni observed, the ability to 
conduct these demo-civil activities explicitly requires prior 
satisfaction of basic material needs. The Brick Factory 
workers, most of whom earned less than $2 a day, were 
not meeting their own basic needs adequately enough to 
productively engage in more abstract communitarian ac-
tivities.  
The residents’ meager existence and resource 
shortfalls precluded them from pursuing the higher com-
munity functions we intended the Ettihad Complex to sup-
port. Although the Ettihad Complex constituted an essen-
tial first step toward a stable democratic community, we 
needed to couple project development with wider initia-
tives addressing wages and work conditions as well.88 
Without accompanying economic initiatives to increase 
social capital and human resources, the local population 
could neither maintain the Ettihad Complex nor fully real-
ize the project’s communitarian potential. With every 
member of every family laboring just to subsist, there was 
no one to study at the school, seek treatment at the 
clinic, gather at the community center, or ensure upkeep 




The lack of individual or collective initiative within Iraqi 
society deterred proactive identification of need and or-
ganization of existing social capital to response to local 
needs 
 Through the course of these civil development pro-
jects, I observed a general unwillingness among the Iraqi 
population to independently initiate or organize projects 
to benefit the whole community or population. This reluc-
tance was partly due to Arabs’ traditional belief in defer-
ence to elders or tribal leaders to make decisions for the 
whole family, village, or tribe.89 But, the preceding five 
decades of Ba’ath Party oppression played a much 
greater role in discouraging local initiative.  The Ba’ath 
“shadow state” made grass-roots initiatives and coopera-
tive projects a lethal proposition. Since seizing power in 
1968, the Ba’ath Party had employed extreme, targeted 
violence and patronage powers from oil wealth to co-opt 
or break any independent vestiges of civil society.90 There-
fore, autonomous organization or cooperation simply did 
not exist in most Iraqi communities. 
Under Saddam Hussein's authoritarian rule patron-
age and hidden networks were used to create a 
“shadow state” that recast Iraqi society by discouraging 
community cooperation and severing the interpersonal 
trust such cooperation required.91    Beyond discouraging 
initiative or organization, Saddam’s regime considered 
any non-Ba’athist cooperation or organization subversive 
and a direct threat to regime control. The regime would 
have sought out and eradicated the types of independ-
ent community functions that I promoted as eminent 
threats to the Ba’athist rule. While we intended our civil 
development projects to reverse such apathy and disen-
gagement, the Balad Ruz population in 2003 was still very 
suspicious and generally uncooperative. For long term 
growth, Iraqis needed a secure environment to imple-
ment democratic processes and observe their positive im-




positive democratic outcomes would require much more 
time than the three months C Troop had in Balad Ruz and 
the Brick Factory areas. 
Gathering input from individual Iraqis was often challeng-
ing due to their traditional social structure that defers to 
elders or sheikhs and discourages individual action  
To better tailor these projects to the population’s 
actual needs, I attempted to engage the local popula-
tion directly, as if planning similar endeavors in the United 
States. While community-based planning techniques such 
as charettes can facilitate the democratic interaction 
and input I sought, they are very different from the auto-
cratic decision-making methods prevalent in Arab culture 
and Iraqi communities.92 During our patrols in the Balad 
Ruz area I often spoke with local residents to gather their 
input about community needs and their suggested solu-
tions.  As a part of these interactions, I also attempted to 
solicit support, such as volunteers and in-kind donations, 
for the impending projects. For Iraqis, as with most Arabs, 
the values of tribal loyalty and deferment to elders were 
deeply engrained in the general population. This was es-
pecially true in the remote areas like the Brick Factory Dis-
trict, where laborers and farmers were both uncomfort-
able and inexperienced with forming and sharing individ-
ual opinions on community matters. 
This influence of authority figures was also a source 
of power that I could have used to better solicit help with 
the Ettihad construction. During the Ettihad planning proc-
ess I developed the idea of soliciting the brick factory 
owners for in-kind donations of their most abundant re-
source to support construction of a school for their work-
ers—bricks. To attain brick donations from the brick fac-
tory owners I approached them individually. While I in-
tended this solicitation as a request to support the com-
munity, it likely appeared to the brick factory owners like 
Saddam’s previous use of power to demand patronage. 
The brick factory owners were generally unresponsive and 
uncooperative to queries. I would have likely engendered 
greater involvement in and support for the Ettihad con-
struction by utilizing their existing social structure. If I had 
courted the local sheiks and elders first, these leaders 
could have commanded and held the brick factory own-
ers accountable for material support. With the endorse-
ment of influential leaders, many more people would 
have felt free (or obligated) to participate and provide 
assistance. 
 
Implementation of the extensive design considerations 
required me to conduct frequent site visits and revision 
meetings with the contractors 
 The Ettihad contractors, like all contractors, were 
primarily interested completing the contract requirements 
at the minimum amount of cost. Any additional costs to 
complete the project would diminish the profit they re-
ceived. Therefore, the contractors had no implicit value 
for the design details and architectural accoutrements I 
wanted to include. For the contractors, a plain utilitarian 
structure would have met the contract requirements and 
yielded the maximum profit. Do to our divergent values in 
the construction process, I had to closely monitor the con-
struction process and issue the according monetary pay-
ments in such a way as to compel the contractors to in-
clude the additional design features I desired.93 One of 
the primary issues noted by the Special Inspector General 
for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) in program reviews was a 
lack of sufficient quality-control and quality-assurance for 
reconstruction projects, resulting in inefficient use of 
American taxpayer dollars.94 Judging from the experi-
ences from other similar reconstruction projects, the Etti-
had Complex’s structural quality and extensive architec-
tural detailing likely could not have occurred without this 




RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
  
Constructing Community’s extensive description 
and supporting materials enable significant process ex-
amination and identification of salient points for future ap-
plication. These are issues, due to their project-specific na-
ture, that broader assessments of Iraqi reconstruction ef-
forts rarely explore. Therefore, the recommendations pro-
vided here pertain more to quality design, construction, 
and management of individual development projects 
than administration of more extensive and longer-running 
reconstruction programs. Just as most of the challenges 
discussed here emanated from incomplete understand-
ing of Arab culture and Iraqi communities, the recom-
mendations also focus on the cultural (rather than admin-
istrative, accounting, financing, etc.) factors and determi-
nants for reconstruction projects in developing locales like 
Iraq. 
 
Agencies responsible for reconstruction should provide 
personnel overseeing design and contracting of recon-
struction projects with additional cultural training that is 
appropriate to their duty location. My generally unsuc-
cessful efforts to engage the local population to solicit vol-
unteers and in-kind contributions demonstrated some of 
my fundamental unfamiliarity with Iraqi culture. I deferred 
to my personal knowledge and experiences due to my 
lack of understanding about basic cultural differences 
that made my Western assumptions less applicable. Other 
challenges I encountered during the reconstruction pro-
jects resulted from my lack of basic knowledge about art, 
architecture, and planning traditions in Arab culture and 
Iraqi communities. Some basic knowledge, such as under-
standing the Islamic prohibition on depicting humans in 
art, would have averted some ill-fitted solutions I pro-
posed. The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruc-
tion (SIGIR) observed similar deficiencies across recon-
struction experiences in Iraq. 95 For reconstruction projects 
to fully succeed, contracting and overseeing personnel 
must assess the impact of cultural complexities as well as 
the fiscal and administrative aspects of project manage-
ment. Due to the intricate differences between cultures 
and operating environments, this cultural training should 
address the specific characteristics and complexities of 
the place the individual will operate. 
Provide all personnel supervising or administering recon-
struction projects with basic urban planning and urban 
design instruction as part of their standard training. Often 
the most influential factor for determining how well com-
munity reconstruction projects will serve their intended 
purposes and populations is location. Determining appro-
priate location consists of more than just deciding the pro-
ject’s geographic position or geologic suitability. Effective 
site location also includes such factors as relationship to 
predominant movement patterns, proximity to incompati-
ble or noxious uses and accessibility for the intended us-
ers.96 These determinations require a basic understanding 
of city planning tenants and urban design considerations. 
While project oversight determines the quality of the com-
pleted structure, effective site selection determines 
whether the completed project will ever truly fulfill its in-
tended purpose and realize the intended effect. 
 
Government agencies supervising and contracting recon-
struction efforts should develop the “reach-back” capac-
ity to solicit advice from outside cultural and design ex-
perts. Due to the often specific nature of cultural and de-




projects need to have access to experts, such as archi-
tects or anthropologists, that have specific knowledge 
pertinent to the project considerations. Due to the impor-
tance of cultural understanding to tactical operations, the 
U.S. Army has integrated civilian anthropologists to create 
Human Terrain Systems (HTSs) that are attached to most 
combat brigades.97 Similar capacity must be created to 
support reconstruction operations. While positioning of 
cultural and design experts on location may not be prac-
tical, government agencies should establish a reach-back 
network that will allow project administrators to rapidly 
contact and gain input from experts in the United States 
or elsewhere. 
 
Government agencies involved in architecture-, art-, and 
planning-related reconstruction projects (DoD, USAid, 
etc.) should cooperate to develop a design guide and 
pattern book consisting of pictures, plans, and detailed 
sketches from representative or noteworthy examples of 
appropriate projects. When the Iraqi contractors and I 
were contemplating progressive designs for the projects 
we had very few resources, beyond our own experiences 
and recollections, to gather ideas from and measure 
ideas against. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) provides a guide for designing do-
mestic community development projects which recom-
mends for designers to “identify and prioritize the key de-
sign components of the project—those that will do the 
most to meet user needs, respond to the context and en-
hance the neighborhood.”98 Such a guide would allow 
contracting officers to better inform and oversee the de-
sign process and promote projects that, beyond simply 
meeting basic requirements, are focal points for civic 
pride and reinforcement of progressive community val-





Through subsequent research, discussion, and reflection I have gained addi-
tional insight into the cultural patterns and subtleties that impacted the successes and 
limitations of the Brick Factory and Balad Ruz projects. Since I departed the Balad Ruz 
area immediately following the completion of the Ettihad Complex, I did not get to 
witness the facility’s use or assess the appropriateness of the structure’s design. Many 
of the pictures included in this project were taken as C Troop left the area for the last 
time. While the long-term impacts of these projects is unclear, our attention to and 
deliberate conception of quality design and aesthetic value for community resources 
clearly left a series of projects that, due to their progressive processes and outcomes, 
were not often duplicated in Iraq. The value of this project is to demonstrate how we 
can promote deliberately-designed art, architecture and planning projects in devel-
oping countries and to discuss how we can conceptualize, design and administer 
these more meaningful projects to better serve the populations we seek to secure, 
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Myself standing with (from left): Iraqi Civil Defense Corps( ICDC) Lieutenant, Iraqi interpreter, Iraqi 
contractor Mohamed Hamed, Iraqi contractor Ibrahim Muhamed Ibrahim, and an ICDC soldier. 
 68This project is dedicated to the Iraqis that risked their lives to make my 
idea a reality. Without their cooperation and service, these projects      
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Arab artistic tradition does illustrate and promote the 
effort and activities required to rebuild Iraq’s infra-
structure, economy, and individual communities 
 
When considering  production of murals for public 
consumption and inspiration, I worked to clearly delineate 
the murals purpose and implicit messages . I envisioned  a 
collection of murals reflecting the idea that Iraqis would 
realized prosperity through unity, cooperation, and dedi-
cated labor. Diego Rivera, the most hallowed of modern 
mural painters, identified this premise as the central 
theme for his populist murals. He said, “I placed the col-
lective hero, man-and-machine, higher than the old tradi-
tional heroes of art and legend.”67 For the Balad Ruz mu-
rals, I identified this collective hero as the central theme. 
But, Arab traditions dictated more ideal artistic constructs 
than humans laboring to build communities. Unlike West-
ern realist traditions, Arab traditions are very rarely repre-
sentational. This is due to the Muslim prohibition of repre-
sentation of any living being, especially man, and the 
Arab cultural aversion to physical labor. Therefore, the 
new murals that I intended to promote national pride 
through populist glorification of the laboring classes were 
likely incongruent with Iraq cultural understanding.68 I did 
not understand this Iraqi cultural artifact, which was never 
clearly described by Iraqi themselves,  until my subse-
quent learning with Arab culture. At the time I commis-
sioned the murals these themes seemed, to an American 
born into democracy,  like rational methods to tout the 
required actions and likely benefits of the Iraqi reconstruc-
tion efforts. 
These bills show archetypical modes of 
Arab artistic expression, employing intri-
cate geometric patterns and depicting sig-
nificant religious sites,  but without hu-
man forms. 
The traditional modes of Arab expression 
were coupled with nationalistic representa-
tions of rulers and armies to reinforce the 
powerful perception of dictators and re-
gimes. 
TRADITIONAL MODES OF  
ARABIC ART 
GLORIFICATION OF RULERS  
AND  REGIMES 
 
 
My inspiration for the Iraqi  
Mural Projects came from a 
trans-cultural tradition of 
glorifying labor and labor-
ers. This tradition used hu-
man forms to inspire the 
work required to build 
strong nations. This rever-
ence for the laboring masses 
was not shared by Iraqis, 
who, by Arab tendencies, 
viewed physical labor as 
shameful and to be avoided 
if at all possible.71 
GLORIFICATION OF  NATION BUILDING THROUGH  
PHYSICAL LABOR 
NEW MODES OF ARAB  
EXPRESSION 
As shown in these new currencies, 
Arab governments are starting to 
adopt the progressive themes em-
ployed by many industrialized na-
tions and in the Iraqi Mural Project I 
sponsored. 
The murals that comprised the Iraqi 
Mural Project reflected the themes of 
progress through labor and cooperation. 
But, these murals were not consistent 
with the Iraqi cultural vernacular and 
societal aversions, diluting their effec-
tiveness inspiring the labourous work 
of nation-building. 
IRAQI MURALS DEPICTING  
DEMOCRACY THROUGH LABOR  
AND COOPERATION 
